Faculty Member, Philosophy
Temporary Lecturer
Thesis Title: Doing and Allowing; Acting and Omitting
Brad Hooker
John Cottingham
About
My PhD dissertation, “Doing and Allowing; Acting and Omitting”, explores the nature and moral significance of the distinction between doing and allowing and the distinction between acting and omitting. These distinctions seem to play a fundamental role in common moral practice. However, arguments need to be given to prove that the distinctions are indeed morally significant. I give an analysis of the act/omission distinction based on Jonathan Bennett’s distinction between positive and negative facts about an agent’s conduct. My analysis of the doing/allowing distinction is a development of Philippa Foot’s idea that an agent who does harm is part of the sequence leading to harm. I then give two arguments showing that both the doing/allowing and the act/omission distinctions are morally relevant. Argument One links these distinctions to asymmetries in a normal human’s ability to become aware of different types of potential consequences of his actions. Argument Two claims that in order to permit agents to see themselves as agents, morality must allow agents to recognise an asymmetry between what they do and what they allow.
I am currently extending my doctoral research by considering an alternative argument that the distinction between doing and allowing is morally significant. The argument is based upon the connection between doing, allowing and imposing. I first show that the notion of imposition does not presuppose the distinction between doing and allowing, so the justification is not circular. I then show that an agent who does harm imposes upon the victim, but an agent who allows harm may not impose upon the victim. Additionally, an agent who is forbidden from allowing harm is imposed upon by the victim, whereas an agent who is forbidden from allowing harm may not be imposed upon. Thus a principle which forbids doing harm but permits allowing harm protects person from harmful imposition. The next stage of my argument is to show that morality should protect persons from harmful imposition.
I think that further exploration of the relationship between the harm and the imposition may lead to a more comprehensive understanding of the permissions and constraints governing harmful behaviour. We may have greater protection against imposition that is itself harmful than from imposition that leads to harm.
I am also looking at the non-identity problem and how this affects our obligations not to damage the environment. I am continuing to pursue my side interest in the philosophy of sex. I'm working on a co-authored paper exploring the lines we draw between "consummative sex" and "just fooling around", with Brian Weaver. Additionally, in a solo project I consider the norms governing the use of erotic material within monogamous relationships.
Contact Information
Department of Philosophy
University of Sheffield
Arts Tower
Western bank
Sheffield
S10 2TN United Kingdom
(0044) 1142220589
