Julien Murzi Department of Philosophy University of Sheffield 45, Victoria Street Sheffield, S3 7QB, UK Phone: +44/(0)7830314132 Email: j.murzi@sheffield.ac.uk http://j.murzi.googlepages.com/julienmurzi Areas of specialization Philosophy of Logic, Philosophy of Language, Metaphysics Areas of competence Epistemology, Logic Education PhD in Philosophy, University of Sheffield, 2010 (expected). Dissertation: “Intuitionism and Logical Revision”. Supervisors: Prof. Bob Hale and Dr. Dominic Gregory. PhD in Philosophy, University of Rome “La Sapienza”, June 2008. Dissertation: “The Paradox of Knowability”. Supervisors: Prof. Cesare Cozzo and Prof. Carlo Cellucci. External examiner: Prof. Gabriele Usberti. The PhD was evaluated as “excellent”, the highest mark in the Italian PhD programme. MA in Philosophy, with Distinction (Summa Cum Laude), University of Rome “La Sapienza”, July 2004. Dissertation: “Some Dispositional Solutions to Kripke-Wittgenstein’s Sceptical Paradox”. Supervisors: Prof. Cesare Cozzo and Prof. Tito Magri. Positions held Research Fellow: September 2009 – August 2010, Arché, University of St Andrews (sponsor: the Analysis Trust). Teaching Fellow: October 2008 – February 2009, University of Sheffield. Arché Visiting Student: March – June 2008, Arché, University of St Andrews. Teaching Assistant: March 2007 – February 2008, University of Sheffield. Graduate Research Fellow: October 2006 – present, University of Sheffield. Arché Visiting Student: March – July 2006, Arché, University of St Andrews. Visiting Scholar: September – December 2005, St Louis University. Graduate Research Fellow: October 2004 – October 2007, University of Rome “La Sapienza”. Papers in peer-reviewed journals 1. “Knowability and Bivalence” - forthcoming in Philosophical Studies (published online on 19-2-2009). 2. “Inferentialism and the Categoricity Problem” (with Ole T. Hjortland) - 2009, Analysis 69(3), pp. 480-488. 3. “The Paradox of Idealisation” (with S. Florio) - 2009, Analysis 69(3), pp. 461-469. 4. “How Basic is the Basic Revisionary Argument?” (with L. Incurvati) - 2008, Analysis 68(4), pp. 303-309. Papers under review 1. “Carnap’s Categoricity Problem and the Meaning of the Logical Constants”, submitted, revised, and about to be resubmitted to The Philosophical Quarterly. 1 Invited papers 1. “Harmony and Conservativeness”, for a forthcoming volume on Logical Inferentialism, edited by Neil Tennant and Florian Steinberger. Editions 1. “Church’s Referee Reports on Fitch’s ‘A Definition of Value’ ” (with J. Salerno) - 2009, in J. Salerno (ed.) New Essays on the Knowability Paradox, Oxford University Press. Conference Proceedings 1. “Knowledge, Lotteries and Vagueness” - forthcoming in P. Hanna (ed.), Proceedings of the 2nd International Conference of Philosophy, Athens. 2. “The Realism/Anti-Realism Debate and the Intuitionistic Solution to the Knowability Paradox” (with L. Incurvati) - 2007, in C. Tatasciore, P. Graziani, C. Grimaldi (eds.), Prospettive Filosofiche: Il Realismo, Istituto Italiano per gli Studi Filosofici, Napoli, pp. 99-113. 3. “Do We Really Need Relativism About Truth?” - 2006, in G. Gasser, C. Kanzian, and E. Runggaldier (eds), Proceedings of the XXIX Wittgenstein Symposium, ALWS, Kirchberg am Wechsel, pp. 210-12. Miscellanea 1. “Intuitionism” - forthcoming in Key Terms in Logic, J. Williamson and F. Russo (eds), Continuum Books; also published in The Reasoner, vol. 3, Number 9, September 2009, p. 17. 2. Review of Jonathan Kvanvig, The Paradox of Knowability - 2006, 2R, vol 1., pp. 96-110. Drafts and work in progress 1. “Harmony and Invertibility” 2. “Coming True: a Note on Truth and Temporalism” (with R. Dietz). 3. “Inference and Understanding”. 4. “Manifestability and Decidability”. 5. “Tennant’s Non-Sequitur”. Research I specialize in the philosophies of logic and language and in metaphysics (especially the realism/antirealism debate), but I also have serious interests in epistemology and formal semantics. My PhD thesis in Sheffield is on the topic of intuitionistic logical revision. I examine three arguments for the adoption of intuitionistic logic: the so-called Basic Revisionary Argument, the Church-Fitch Paradox of Knowability, and the Argument from Proof-Theoretic Constraints. My main claim is that, even granting the intuitionist her key metaphysical and semantic assumptions, none of these arguments provides, on its own, compelling reasons for rejecting classical logic in favour of intuitionistic logic. Among other things, I defend a fully functional account of harmony, harmony as full invertibility, which enable us to read off elimination rules from the corresponding introductions, and vice versa. I also show that one can give a harmonious formalization of classical logic by strengthening the rules for disjunction and the existential quantifier in a very natural way. The resulting formalization is both harmonious and categorical, in the sense that (i) introduction and elimination rules are harmonious (on all the existing accounts of harmony, including mine), and (ii) the satisfaction clauses for each of the logical connectives can be derived, on minimal semantic assumptions, from their meaning-constitutive rules. My future work will focus on logical inferentialism and proof-theory. I am seeking to give a unified account of a host of fundamental problem concerning logic, stretching from epistemological ones (how do we know, if at all, logical truths?) to semantic ones (what is the meaning of the logical constants?). The aim of my project is to motivate and defend an inferentialist approach to the 2 meanings of the logical constants (both intuitionistic and classical), and to provide a related prooftheretical account of logical consequence. Some objections—categoricity, the McGee-like examples, circularity—will be discussed along the way. My Italian PhD thesis critically discusses some recent solutions to the Paradox of Knowability, especially the intuitionistic ones. I argue that the paradox poses a serious problem for Michael Dummett’s semantic anti-realism, and I provide new reasons for doubting the tenability of the intuitionistic solutions to the problem, defended by Timothy Williamson and, more recently, by Dummett himself. Other research interests include (i) topics in the philosophy of language proper, such as the semantics of future contingents, truth-relativism, vagueness (especially intuitionist treatments of the Sorites Paradox), the temporalism/eternalism debate, i.e. the question whether propositions may change their truth-values over time, (ii) the semantic and set-theoretic paradoxes, and (iii) topics in epistemology, especially scepticism and epistemic contextualism. Teaching Experience 1. Autumn 2008. PHI 335/PHI 6630, 3rd year undergraduate/MA course in the Philosophy of Language. Title of the course: Realism and Anti-realism. Department of Philosophy, University of Sheffield. I designed and planned the course. I wrote and gave all the 22 lectures. I also ran weekly seminars: one for undergraduates, and one for the MA students. I had one-to-one meetings with students to discuss their essays drafts, and I marked all course essays and exams. 2. Autumn-Spring 2007. 1st year tutor at the Department of Philosophy, University of Sheffield. I have tutored for the following first year courses: PHI 121: Knowledge, Justification and Doubt (Autumn 2007). PHI 115: Reason and Argument (Autumn 2007). PHI 126: Mind, Brain, and Personal Identity (Spring 2007). Refereed Talks 1. October 2009, Amsterdam: ‘Carnap’s Categoricity Problem and the Meaning of the Logical Constants”, Amsterdam Graduate Philosophy Conference. Commentator: Dick de Jongh. 2. September 2009, L’Aquila: “Coming True: A Note on Truth and Actuality”, 2009 Latin Meeting in Analytic Philosophy: Language and Temporality. Commentator: Neftalí Villanueva. 3. July 2009, London: “Harmony and invertibility”, BPPC, King’s College. 4. June 2009, Hejnice: “Carnap’s Categoricity Problem and the Meaning of the Logical Constants”, Logica 2009. 5. January 2009, Cambridge: “Inferentialism and the Categoricity Problem: Reply to Raatikainen” (with O. T. Hjortland), Graduate Conference on the Philosophies of Logic and Mathematics. Commentator: Peter Smith. 6. October 2008, St Andrews: “Inferentialism and the Categoricity Problem”, Arché, University of St Andrews. 7. June 2008, Canterbury: “Knowability and Bivalence”, BPPC, University of Kent. (Awarded best paper of the 2008 edition of the BPPA.) 8. January 2008, Cambridge: “The Paradox of Idealisation”, Graduate Conference on the Philosophies of Logic and Mathematics. Commentator: Luca Incurvati. 9. December 2007, Baltimore: “The Paradox of Idealisation” (with S. Florio), Eastern Division of the APA. Commentator: Joe Salerno. 10. November 2007, Oxford: “The Paradox of Idealisation”, 11th Oxford Graduate Conference. Commentator: Tim Williamson. 3 11. November 2007, Paris: “Actuality in Branching Time”, Context–Dependence, Perspective and Relativity in Language and Thought, Ecole Normale Supérieure and Institut Jean Nicod. 12. November 2007, St Andrews: “How Basic is the Basic Revisionary Argument?” (with L. Incurvati), 4th Arché/CSMM Graduate Conference. Commentator: Marcus Rossberg. 13. September 2007, Bergamo: “Actuality in Branching Time”, International Conference on the Metaphysics of Time, University of Bergamo. 14. July 2007, Norwich: “The Paradox of Idealisation”, BPPC, University of East Anglia. 15. July 2007, Bristol: “The Paradox of Idealisation”, Joint Session of the Aristotelian Society and of the Mind Association, University of Bristol. 16. July 2007, Leeds: “The Paradox of Idealisation”, Second Graduate Conference of the CMM, Center for the Metaphysics and Mind, University of Leeds. 17. June 2007, Athens: “Lotteries, Knowledge and Vagueness”, International Philosophy Conference. 18. April 2007, San Francisco: “The Church-Fitch Paradox and the Problem of Transworld Knowability”, Pacific Division of the APA. Commentator: Roy Cook. 19. January 2007, Miami: “Lotteries, Knowledge and Vagueness”, International Graduate Conference in Epistemology, University of Miami. Commentator: Ben Burgis. 20. December 2006, Washington DC: “Lotteries, Knowledge and Vagueness”, SRAD, Society for the Realist and Anti-Realist Discussion, Eastern Division of the APA. 21. September 2006, Aix-en-Provence: “The Church-Fitch Paradox and the Problem of Transworld Knowability”, SOPHA, International Meeting of the French Society for Analytical Philosophy. 22. August 2006, Kirchberg am Wechstel: “Do We Really Need Relativism about Truth?” Cultures: Conflict-Analysis-Dialog, XXIX International Wittgenstein Symposium. 23. June 2006, Nancy: “Possible Knowledge of Actual Truths”, Réalisme(s) et Anti-Réalisme(s), International Philosophy Conference, University of Nancy 2. 24. June 2006, Lisbon: “Possible Knowledge of Actual Truths”, ENFA, Portuguese National Conference for Analytic Philosophy. Invited Talks 1. January 2007, Geneva: “Church-Fitch, Idealisation and Knowability”. Internal Talks 1. November 2009, St Andrews: “Harmony and Invertibility”, Foundations of Logical Consequence Seminar, Arché. 2. March 2009, Sheffield: “Carnap’s Categoricity Problem and the Meanings of the Logical Constants”, Graduate Seminar, University of Sheffield. 3. October 2008, Sheffield: “Inferentialism and the Categoricity Problem”, Graduate Seminar, University of Sheffield. 4. May 2008, St Andrews: “Assertion, Denial and Negation” (with O. T. Hjortland), University of St Andrews, Core Seminar, Arché. 5. May 2008, St Andrews: “Assertion, Denial and Negation”, University of Sheffield, Graduate Seminar, Arché. 6. March 2008, Sheffield: “Harmony and Multiple Conclusions”, Graduate Seminar. 7. October 2007, Sheffield: “How Basic is the Basic Revisionary Argument?” (with Luca Incurvati), Graduate Seminar. 8. February 2007, Sheffield: “Eternalism Undermined?”, Graduate Seminar, University of Sheffield. 4 9. December 2006, Sheffield: “Knowledge, Lotteries and Vagueness”, University if Sheffield. 10. October 2006, Sheffield: “The Church-Fitch Paradox and the Problem of Transworld Knowability”, Graduate Seminar, University of Sheffield. 11. July 2006, St Andrews: “All Truths are Known? A New Defence of an Old Solution to the Church-Fitch Paradox”, University of Saint Andrews, Arché. 12. June 2006, St Andrews: “Branching Future, Absolute Truth”, University of Saint Andrews, Arché. 13. May 2005, Rome: “The Paradox of Knowability: Dummett, Tennant and the New Paradoxes”, Graduate Seminar. 14. May 2004, Rome: “Dispositional Solutions to Kripke’s Wittgenstein Paradox of Rule-Following”, Graduate Seminar. Other Activities 1. July 2007, Ovronnaz (CH): Comments on Fabian Dorsch’s,“The Ontology of Artworks”, École Doctorande Romande, Metaphysics Workshop. 2. September 2005, Barcelona: Official Discussant, ‘Relativizing Utterance Truth’, LOGOS, International Workshop. Grants and Awards 2009-10: Analysis Studentship, Analysis Trust (worth 12.500 £) 2008-9: Annual Studentship, University of Sheffield (worth 13.000 £). 2008-9: Teaching Scholarship, University of Sheffield (worth 7.000 £). 2008: “Knowability and Bivalence” nominated best paper of the 2008 edition of the BPPC. 2007-8: Royal Institute of Philosophy, annual bursary (worth 2.500 £). 2007: Winner of a Travel Stipend Award at the Eastern APA, Baltimore, with the paper “The Paradox of Idealization” (worth 300 $). 2006-7: Perfectionment Grant, University of Rome “La Sapienza” (worth 15.000 €). 2006-9: Fee Waiver, University of Sheffield. 2004-2007: PhD maintenance grant from the University of Rome “La Sapienza” (worth 38.000 €). Professional Service I have refereed papers for the following journals: Dialectica, The Philosophical Quarterly, Synthese, and Erkentnnis. Professional Memberships Member of the Aristotelian Society since 2007. Member of the APA (American Philosophical Association) since 2006. Member of the SIFA (Società Italiana di Filosofia Analitica) since 2004. 5 References Prof. Bob Hale University of Sheffield, S3 7QB r.hale@sheffield.ac.uk Dr. Dominic Gregory University of Sheffield, S3 7QB d.gregory@sheffield.ac.uk Dr. Rosanna Keefe University of Sheffield, S3 7QB r.keefe@sheffield.ac.uk Prof. Ian Rumfitt Birkbeck College, London, WC1E 7HX i.rumfitt@bbk.ac.uk Prof. Stephen Read, University of St Andrews, slr@st-andrews.ac.uk Date: 05-10-2009 6